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Abstract
This  article  explores  the  relationship  between  social  backgrounds  –  socio-
economic  status  and  ethnicity  –  and  European  knowledge,  identities  and
attitudes to  European Union (EU)  membership  in  two member  states  – the
Eastern European newcomer Bulgaria and the Western European notoriously
Eurosceptic United Kingdom. It  adopts an empirical  sociological  approach in
line with recent calls for more sociological input into EU studies. By drawing on
174 individual interviews with 9/10-year-old primary school pupils, the paper is
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focused on young people: a group which ‘holds the key’ to the future of the EU,
yet is entirely neglected by academics and policy-makers. The findings suggest
that  despite  the  substantial  national  differences,  the  significance  of  socio-
economic status and ethnicity is strong cross-nationally.  European identity is
largely elite and racialized and those at the margins of society in my sample are
not at all involved in the European project. A key theoretical contribution this
paper  makes is  to  move beyond mono-causal  explanations by providing an
account  of  the  intersection  of  national  context,  socio-economic  status  and
ethnicity in relation to young people’s European identities.
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The European Union ‘has a tremendous impact on the European citizens’ lives’
(Díez Medrano, 2008: 4) and it plays an important role as an international actor.
However, one key problem threatens its future and development: the lack of
democratic legitimation, recently exacerbated after the last wave of enlargement
towards Eastern and Central Europe and the Eurozone crisis. This democratic
legitimation ‘depends on the development of a more robust common European
identity’ (Bache and George, 2006: 66). While a number of authors have looked
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at  various  issues  related  to  European  identity  development,  very  few  have
explored  the  relationship  between  European  identities  and  socio-economic
status  and  ethnicity.  Yet,  as  Sanchez  (2006:  33)  argues,  identities  are
grounded’ in ‘social structures and realities’. Moreover, as Tolonen (2013: 55)
rightfully  reminds  us  in  this  journal,  ‘if  closer  attention  is  paid  to  the  living
circumstances of young people, it is apparent that social, cultural and material
structures have a strong presence in their lives.’ 
This article, therefore, aims to fill  an important gap in the literature by
comparing  the  relationship  between  social  backgrounds  –  socio-economic
status  and  ethnicity  –  and  European  knowledge,  identities  and  attitudes  to
European  Union  (EU)  membership  in  two  member  states  –  the  Eastern
European  newcomer  Bulgaria  and  the  Western  European  notoriously
Eurosceptic United Kingdom. It  adopts an empirical  sociological  approach in
line with recent calls for  more sociological input into EU studies (Favell  and
Guiraudon, 2009, 2011; Saurugger and Merand, 2010). The study is focused on
a group almost  entirely  neglected by  academics  and policy-makers,  namely
young  people  at  the  age  of  9-10.  Young  people  are  very  important  actors
(Jukarainen, 2003) because attitudes towards Europe and European identities
start developing from an early age (Barrett, 2007). From the age of 6 children
‘select’ a national identity and by 9 they attribute considerable significance to it.
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Subsequently, by 10 they might endorse a supranational identity such as the
European one (Barrett, 2007). Furthermore, identities formed in childhood and
adolescence are expected to be less malleable (Jenkins, 1996). As Hooghe and
Dassonneville (2013: 2) argue in this journal, ‘research suggests quite strongly
that even at an early age, adolescents already have well-developed ideas about
how they will participate in political life once they are adults.’ 
Finally,  identities  do  not  just  develop overnight  once a  young person
becomes “officially” an adult and it is equally impossible to draw a line between
children and youth or  adolescents  because identity  formation  is  an  ongoing
process whose development should be traced back by focusing attention on
younger age groups. Hence, the study will examine whether and to what extent
intra-national  differences  in  young  people’s  identifications,  knowledge  and
attitudes can be explained with reference to socio-economic status (SES) and
ethnicity. In other words, is the European identity equally endorsed by young
people  of  different  backgrounds?  By  conducting  the  research  in  two  EU
member states - Bulgaria and the UK - the influence of national context will be
revealed.  The  study  utilizes  a  mixed-methods  approach:  it  draws  on  174
individual semi-structured interviews with 9/10-year-old primary school pupils as
well  as  content  analysis  of  textbooks  and  national  curricula  materials  and
interviews  with  parents,  teachers  and  head-teachers.  The  next  sections  will
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outline the theoretical contributions the study aims to make before presenting
the methodology and the empirical data.
The Sociology of European Identity: Illusion or Reality?
Even a brief overview suggests that sociology and EU studies rarely go hand-in-
hand. Political scientists, economists and historians have much more actively
contributed to the subject area. It is beyond the scope of this paper to trace the
reasons for  this  not  least  because others have successfully  done this (Díez
Medrano, 2008; Favell  and Guiraudon, 2009; Saurugger and Merand, 2010).
Nevertheless, a few arguments are pertinent. First,  as Favell  and Guiraudon
(2009)  state,  sociology’s  potential  input  should  not  be  underestimated.  The
dominating approach in EU studies, which is a largely top-down one and indeed
fixed on ‘what lies above water’ – ‘the visible institutions and policies of the EU’
(Favell and Guiraudon, 2009: 551) - has numerous advantages. But, this focus
on the EU as a ‘political construction’ should be complemented by ‘the study of
European Union as an economic and societal process’ (Favell and Guiraudon,
2009: 552). Moreover, as  Díez Medrano (2008: 4) states, it ‘makes sense’ to
conduct sociological research ‘now’ rather than a few decades ago, because
the EU covers ‘a whole range’ of areas and ‘has a tremendous impact on the
European citizens’ lives.’
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Nonetheless,  when  studying  European  identities  scholars  have  often
endorsed  predominantly  psychological  frameworks,  which  focus  on  the
individual  or  largely  ‘constructivist’  ones,  utilizing  ‘soft  methods  such  as
discourse analysis and meta-theory’ (Favell and Guiraudon, 2009: 569), thus
underestimating the role of society. One area in which the societal process can
be traced is  by investigating whether certain social  strata support  European
integration  and  endorse  European  identity  more  vehemently  than  others. Is
Europeanness  a  predominantly  upper  class,  elite-driven  process?  Would  it
matter  if  European  integration  is  equally  endorsed  by  people  of  different
backgrounds? The study will  address these questions by focusing on young
people  because it  is  worth  finding out  not  only  whether  social  backgrounds
influence Europeanness, but whether this process starts from an early age. 
There are two main ways in  which similar  issues have been tackled.
First, in an innovative fashion Díez Medrano (2008: 10-13) investigates whether
people  with  strong levels  of  European identification constitute  a ‘“European”
middle class’. Unsurprisingly, his conclusions are not optimistic but they might in
part be a result of his very minimalistic definition of ‘European’ - people who
‘identify  more with Europe than with their  nation’  (Díez Medrano, 2008: 10).
Second, the dominating approach in relation to social backgrounds (overviews
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in Carey, 2002 and Gabel, 1998) involves a focus on the role of ‘demographics’
or ‘individual-level’ factors on support for European integration. 
Integration  studies  (e.g.  Carey,  2002;  Clements,  2009;  Gabel,  1998)
suggest  that  education  and  social  class/occupation  influence  attitudes  and
support for European integration. Those with higher education and social status
are more likely to have a positive attitude towards Europe. The impact of age is
not that clear (Carey, 2002; Clements, 2009). Ethnicity is also rarely present as
an  indicator  and  the  results  about  its  impact  are  contradictory.  In  Britain
Cinnirella  and Hamilton (2007:  496) claim that  South-Asian ethnic  minorities
have ‘manifested a higher European identity’, whereas Clements (2009) says
that race ‘does not appear to be an important factor in shaping opinions towards
the EU.’ By contrast, in Convery et al’s (1997) study ethnic minority children
know less about Europe and feel less European. This article will also look into
the role of ethnicity, but instead of merely focusing on attitudes and support for
European  integration,  it  will  investigate  the  relationship  between  social
backgrounds and European identity, because support for European integration
and European identity are ‘different, though related, issues’ (Díez Medrano and
Gutierrez, 2001: 755).
Why Bulgaria and England?
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Two reasons guided the choice of a most different systems design (MDSD),
which  is  about  comparing  different  rather  than  similar  countries.   First,
Przeworski and Teune (1970: 34) claim it is more suitable than the most similar
systems design (MSSD) when the interest is in the ‘variation of the observed
behaviour at a level lower than that of systems’ such as individuals, groups,
communities. A good approach is to compare countries ‘because of a common
democratic structure or institutional membership, such as membership of the
EU’ (Livingstone, 2012). One of the key advantages of using MSSD is that it
allows researchers to “test” the importance of national differences rather than to
“presume the nation’s importance” (Livingstone, 2011). Moreover, as Beniger
(1992: 32) argues ‘in fact it is through just such comparison of disparate things
that  social  science  has  made  its  greatest  advances”.  Second,  the  EU
encompasses different states and its motto is ‘unity in diversity’. By comparing
countries  with  different  historical,  cultural  and  political  trajectories,  a  fuller
picture about the potential factors that play a role can be drawn. Bulgaria and
England are indeed very different from each other. For a number of decades
they were part of two blocs on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain, ‘engaged’ in a
Cold War. Bulgaria is a representative of the Eastern European bloc. It is an
average-sized EU member, one of the newest entrants with the last wave of
enlargement  and  the  poorest  at  present.  In  general,  support  for  European
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integration in the country is among the highest in the Union, though declining
with membership. England, on the other hand, is part of the United Kingdom –
one of the richest, biggest and oldest EU members, situated in Western Europe.
Support for European integration is among the lowest in the UK and England is
perhaps the most Eurosceptic of the four nations (Wellings, 2014). To sum up, if
the EU is indeed about ‘unity in diversity,’ and European identity is the unifying
characteristic the study is interested in,  then it  is  far  better  to  compare two
seemingly quite varied members than similar ones because they will provide a
better illustration of the impact of diversity. It will be much easier to conclude on
the ‘universality’ of significance of socio-economic status or ethnicity in relation
to young people’s European knowledge and identifications if similar trends in
regards to these variables/factors are found in two such different countries. In
other words, it is highly likely that if certain patterns and influences stand out in
spite of all national differences, then they are really important for the process of
European identity formation. 
The proponents of comparing similar case studies/countries will probably
disagree with the above statement and will instead argue that it will be difficult
to  establish  the  relationship  between  the  independent  and  the  dependent
variable in two countries in which the dependent variables are likely to differ.
Scholars (a review in Anckar, 2008: 390) have demonstrated, however, that ‘it
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will never be possible to keep constant all potential explanatory factors’ and that
even similar countries are not really that similar and attempts at simplifying and
putting together countries in certain groups (“Western Europe”, “Arab world”,
etc.) have often ‘obscured altogether what was significant theoretically about
those countries’ (Teune, 1990: 43). This paper will attempt to achieve a balance
between  standardization  and  contextualization  by  using  a  combination  of
quantitative and qualitative data, thus the importance of national differences will
not be assumed but will be probed in the analysis together with the importance
of other factors such as socio-economic background and ethnicity. 
Socio-economic status, ethnicity and school: Cross-national differences
Bulgaria and England are two very different countries and it is important to see
what the potential impact of social backgrounds is. Social inequality is perhaps
higher  in  England  than  in  Bulgaria,  given  that  ‘one  of  the  largest-scale
destratification experiments in the history of the human race’ (Ganzeboom and
Nieuwbeerta, 1999: 340) took place during communism. A UNDP report (2007:
5) claims that if there is a middle class in Bulgaria, it is virtually incomparable to
the traditional middle classes of Western Europe because of low income levels.
Three  indicators  will  measure  SES.  The most  one is  occupation,  but
‘there are some occupational categories whose status appears incongruent with
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their income or education’ (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007: 1099). This is certainly
true in Bulgaria where higher occupational status is not necessarily a reflection
of higher education.  Estimates (Raichev and Stoychev, 2008:  50)  show that
roughly 30% of Bulgarians work in jobs not equivalent to their qualifications.
Another measure of SES, especially when researching young people, is
the schools they attend. But school will not be a sufficient indicator because of
the  different  segregation  patterns.  English  schools  are  ‘highly  socially
segregated’  (Smithers  and  Robinson,  2010:  i).  There  are  also  instances  of
ethnic clustering but mainly as a result of parents’ choice. By contrast, schools
in  Bulgaria  are  segregated  primarily  along  ethnic  lines  –  although  these
sometimes  coincide  with  SES.  Bulgaria  has  been  widely  criticised  for  the
segregation of its Roma minority. ‘70% of the Roma children of school age are
currently  educated  in  the  Roma  ghetto  schools’  (Ivanov,  2006).  Although
allegedly a process of desegregation (Nounev, 2006) is under way, one of the
schools in this sample was 100% Roma. On the level of SES, however, school
does not play the same role in perpetuating inequalities as in England mainly
because during communism the strategies of ‘destratification’ of society were
concentrated in and executed through school (Ganzeboom and Nieuwbeerta,
1999: 340). 
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Finally, although the focus of this paper is on SES and ethnicity rather than
socialisation as a process, the above outline demonstrates that the role of a key
socialization agent such as school should also be explored. Farrell (2010: 107-
108)  argues  that  school  is  ‘the  primary  site  of  the  creation  of  identity’  and
‘education is used as the field to habituate a European identity.’  There have
been a few policy steps in that respect from the 1970s onwards. The emphasis
has  been  on  promoting  cross-national  exchanges  and  mobility  but  most
initiatives target older adolescents or young adults. While there is some value in
incorporating teaching about the EU in national curricula, sociologists (Farrell,
2010) believe that the most effective way is by providing more opportunities for
everyday life interaction through exchange trips. It will also be interesting to see
whether travelling to other European countries plays a role in relation to young
people’s European knowledge and identifications.
Beyond  Mono-Causal  Explanations:  the  Intersection  of  National
context, SES and Ethnicity
It  became  clear  that  a  number  of  factors  are  likely  to  influence  young
people’s European identities. The first one is national context. Second, socio-
economic and ethnic differences are also likely to play a role. The expectation is
that inequality is more significant along socio-economic lines in England and
ethnic ones in Bulgaria. But what is the relationship between national context,
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SES and ethnicity? Clements (2009: 54) offers a model of an assumed causal
ordering of variables. ‘Explanatory factors’ are ‘grouped into blocs containing
variables  of  a  similar  type’  arranged according  to  their  relationship  with  the
dependent variable. Thus, ‘fixed personal characteristics’ such as age, gender
and race are in the first bloc and ‘cause’ at least partially education (second
bloc)  and  then  all  ‘acquired  social  characteristics’.  Making  claims  about
causality in the social sciences is problematic but even more so in our case.
What is the relationship between education and social class or in fact between
national  identity  and  education  in  Bulgaria?  Is  national  identity  ‘caused’  by
education or is it  the other way round? How do we compare two countries?
Moreover,  as  Slavtcheva-Petkova  (2013)  argues,  social  structures  work  in
conjunction  with  socialisation  as  a  process  and  it  is  neither  feasible  nor
desirable to look for causal relationships between factors that do not interplay in
a linear fashion. The sample is fairly small and not representative and it is much
better to endorse Crenshaw’s (1989) concept of intersectionality (Rasmussen,
2010; Tolonen, 2013), which is a qualitative approach. National differences are
closely intertwined with socio-economic and ethnic differences and we are likely
to observe a mutual reinforcement of inequalities, or ‘intersectionality’. We might
find that some young people are ‘hit’ by ‘multiple forms of exclusion’ (Crenshaw,
2004). Thus, a Bulgarian Roma child from a poor background is considerably
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more likely to feel excluded from the European project than an English majority
child from a privileged background. McCall’s (2005) intracategorical complexity
approach is adopted - we start with pre-conceived categories and then explore
relationships when trends of intersectionality are apparent. A key contribution
this study makes, therefore, is to move beyond mono-causal explanations by
showing the intersection of national context,  SES and ethnicity in relation to
young  people’s  European  identities.  This  analysis  will  be  conducted  in  a
predominantly qualitative way by closely exploring the relationships between the
different  factors  rather  than  conducting  any  form of  multivariate  quantitative
analysis. 
The research questions are:
RQ1:  What  is  the  relationship  between  SES  and  ethnicity  and  young
people’s European knowledge, identifications and support for EU membership?
RQ2: To what extent is the importance of SES and ethnicity contingent on
national context? 
RQ3: What is the relationship between SES, ethnicity and national context in




Recruitment of participants took place through theoretical sampling. Samples
were  ethnically  boosted  (32.7% in  Bulgaria  and  35.8% in  the  UK),  so  that
conclusions  can  be  drawn  about  ethnicity.  The  focus  was  on  two  minority
groups  –  Roma in  Bulgaria  and  Asian  young  people,  mainly  from India,  in
England. Given the sample size, it was not possible to include representatives
of a variety of ethnic groups or indeed of all four nations in the UK. Therefore,
the label ‘ethnic minority’ is hardly telling given that the two minority groups are
different from each other: historically and culturally but also in relation to Europe
and potentially the EU. These differences undoubtedly have repercussions on
the level  of  European identities.  Attempts are consistently made not  only to
report on the role of ethnicity but also to account for the possible reasons that
explain that role. However, it is still important to preserve the ethnic minority
label because both the respective member states and the EU institutions use
similar labels and if despite the differences common trends are found, then we
can argue with greater certainty that ethnicity is an important factor. 
All 174 participants (67 in England and 107 in Bulgaria) were recruited
through schools after parental consent. The head teachers of schools whose
catchment areas cover different socio-economic characteristics (as determined
by  Ofsted  reports  in  England  and  local  council  statistics  in  Bulgaria)  were
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approached to ensure a fair representation. The main aim was to achieve some
variation along socio-economic and gender lines and representatives from at
least two ethnic groups from each country. Initially, two towns of fairly similar
size and distance from the capital cities were included. Nearly all  schools in
both towns were approached but while in Bulgaria all head teachers agreed to
participate, in England only 50% agreed. Due to the lack of representation of
schools from more deprived neighbourhoods and with ethnic minority children,
additional  schools in  a  nearby town,  village and city  were approached.  The
further  recruitment  of  participants  was  strictly  based  on  the  principles  of
theoretical sampling to ensure fair representation of different socio-economic
and at least two ethnic groups. Once a school was selected all pupils in the
respective year group were invited to participate. The response rate was 35% –
46% in Bulgaria and 25% in England. One parent questionnaire per household
was  distributed  and  67.2%  were  returned  (79.4%  in  Bulgaria  and  48%  in
England).  Teachers  and  headteachers  were  also  interviewed  and  the
educational curricula and relevant textbooks were analysed.
Given the size of the total  pupil  population in that age group and the
guiding  principle  of  theoretical  saturation,  the  study  did  not  aim  for
representativeness and generalisation. Table 1 shows how the sample deviated
from the national average. The gender ratios were fairly similar but the samples
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were ethnically boosted. The data was also subjected to negative case analysis
so any findings that  appeared to  contradict  the  main  emerging  trends were
thoroughly investigated (Slavtcheva-Petkova and Mihelj, 2013). 
Table 1
Measures
Young  people’s  views  were  researched  through  semi-structured  individual
interviews,  conducted  between  February  2009  and  February  2010.  Each
interview lasted between 45 minutes and an hour and a half.  The European
questions were closed-  and open-ended.  Cards and photographs were also
used. Data on social backgrounds was gathered. In the interviews young people
were  asked  a  range  of  questions,  but  this  article  focuses  on  a  few  fairly
representative of the respective topics. On knowledge, the questions are: ‘Do
you  know what  Europe  is?’,  ‘Do you know what  the  EU is?’  and  two  card
questions in which young people were asked whether they recognised the EU
flag  and  the  euro.  On  identity,  one  quantitative  question  and  its  follow-up
qualitative question are discussed: ‘Are you European?’ and ‘Why did you say
you are not European?’ if the answer to the first question was ‘no’. Some open-
ended questions are also used: ‘What does it mean to be European?’, ‘What do
you think Europe is?’ and ‘What do you think the EU is?’ On support for EU
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membership, the question is: ‘Do you think Bulgaria/Britain should be part of the
EU?’ Extracts from the interviews will be used to illustrate some trends and as
examples of answers to the qualitative questions.
European Identities between Class and Ethnicity
The sample indicates some national differences between the two countries in
the levels of European identification and awareness and knowledge of the EU
(table 2). The socio-economic and ethnic structures of the two countries also
differ  significantly,  and it  is  reasonable to expect that  their  impact on young
people’s  European  identifications  and  knowledge  will  differ  accordingly.  To
assess whether  that  is  the  case in  my sample,  the data from Bulgaria  and
England are reviewed separately.
Table 2
SES
Regardless of which indicator of SES is examined, the results imply that young
people from poorer backgrounds in my sample know less about Europe and the
EU, are less likely  to identify  as European,  and are less in support  of  their
country’s EU membership than their wealthier peers. In Bulgaria, this applies
most fully to the young people from the school, located in a district with the
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lowest SES. Both the EU flag and the euro look familiar to considerably fewer
pupils in this school: only 60.6% have seen the EU flag1 (Table 3) and 45.5%
the euro coin as opposed to an average of 94.9% and 76.7%, respectively.
These pupils are also predominantly against EU membership. The most notable
distinction is, however, in the level of European identification, where only 6.1%
in  the  school  located  in  the  poorest  neighbourhood  define  themselves  as
European as opposed to an average 51.4%.
Table 3
Similar patterns of association appear when examining links with parental
occupation.  There  is  a  clear  association  with  European  knowledge  and
especially identification: 76% of young people whose parents are in highest-
paid jobs say they are European as opposed to  only  9.5% of  those whose
parents are in lowest-paid jobs. Also, all young people whose parents’ jobs are
in grades AB have seen the EU flag in contrast to 61.9% in grades DE. The
degree of support for membership is also higher among young people whose
parents are in highest job occupations (76%) than in lowest job grades (33.3%).
These tendencies are supported by the comparison on the basis of parents’
education. Young people in my sample whose parents have higher education
tend  to  feel  more  European.  Similarly,  the  percentage  of  supporters  of  EU
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membership is highest among children whose parents have completed at least
secondary school. 
The  findings  are  interesting  indeed  because  they  run  against  some
academic  arguments.  Despite  the  allegedly  less  significant  stratification  in
Bulgaria and high percentage of people who work in jobs not equivalent to their
qualifications,  my  study  suggests  that  European  identity  is  stronger  among
young  people  whose  parents  are  in  better-paid  jobs  that  require  higher
qualifications. Even in this seemingly less socially stratified society, European
identity is class-dependent. 
Are the social divisions in the European project even stronger in my English
sample then? The data seem to support this expectation. Young people differ in
their levels of European identification and EU knowledge. The lowest level of
knowledge of Europe is in the school situated in the most deprived area of the
county. Differences are even more notable when it comes to EU knowledge,
where no one in the poorest area school knows what the EU is. Similarly, 90%
and 75%, respectively, of the pupils from the two schools situated in the most
advantaged areas recognise the EU flag, in contrast to only 12.5% of pupils in
the  school  in  the  poorest  area.  The  same  trend  is  repeated  in  terms  of
European identification and support for EU membership. Thus, no one in the
most disadvantaged area school  says s/he is European.  Moreover,  only the
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young people from this school think Britain should not be part of the EU (62.5%
vs. 5% on average).
Parents’  occupational  status  implies  a  similar  conclusion.  Young  people
whose parents are in better-paid jobs know more about Europe and the EU and
feel more European but there is no clear trend in support of EU membership.
The association seems to be the strongest for European identity – stronger than
in  Bulgaria,  which  is  likely  a  result  of  more  substantial  class  differences  in
England. In reality, these tendencies are probably stronger: due to missing data
results do not include the young people from the school in the most deprived
area.
The relationship between parents’ education and European knowledge and
identification  in  my  English  sample  is  less  clear-cut.  Young  people  whose
parents  have  attended  higher  education  seem  to  feel  European  but  these
findings  should  be  approached  with  caution  due  to  missing  data  and  the
significance tests. 
Ethnicity
The results suggest that the class-related divisions in part coincide with or are
reinforced by ethnic ones. The recognition of the EU flag is considerably higher
among ethnic Bulgarians in my sample than Roma. Moreover, twice as many
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ethnic  Bulgarians say Bulgaria  should be part  of  the EU and 4 times more
Roma are against membership. The most significant difference, however, is in
the  level  of  European  identification:  only  two  Roma  define  themselves  as
European in contrast to more than a half of ethnic Bulgarian in my sample.
Evidently,  the  most  recent  attempts  to  integrate  the  Roma  minority,  boldly
labelled ‘the decade of Roma inclusion’, have not yet succeeded. The results
support Ivanov’s (2006) claim that ethnic segregation in schools is still evident
and imply that this segregation has repercussions in the realm of European
identifications. In Bulgaria feeling European is not only a class-bound identity,
but also a racialized one.
In line with our expectations, the impact of ethnicity in my English sample
is  not  as  significant.  Ethnic  majority  and minority  young people  are  equally
knowledgeable about Europe, but slightly differ in their knowledge about the EU
as well as in their ability to recognise the EU flag and the euro. As many as
92.9% and 57.1% of ethnic majority pupils in my sample recognise the currency
and the flag as opposed to 80% and 36% of minority pupils. As in Bulgaria, the
most considerable discrepancy is in European identification: 66.7% of the ethnic
British in my sample define themselves as European in contrast to 28% of the
minority. However, unlike in Bulgaria, there are no ethnicity-based differences in
young people’s attitudes towards Europe in my sample. 
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Intersections between class and ethnicity and the role of national context
To  better  explain  the  findings,  it  is  now  important  to  look  at  the
interrelationship  between  class,  ethnicity  and  national  context,  including  the
educational  system.  There  appear  to  be  trends  of  intersectionality  in  both
countries  but  stronger  in  my  Bulgarian  sample,  which  partially  explains  the
notable  difference  in  European  knowledge  (albeit  not  necessarily  identity)
between Roma and Indian-origin children. There is a link between ethnicity and
SES in Bulgaria:  none of the parents from the ethnic minority  school  are in
highest-paid occupations (AB) as opposed to 40% on average. In contrast, as
many as 42.4% of parents in the Roma school are in categories DE compared
to 9.5% on average. In the UK, 22.7% of parents from the ethnic minority school
are in AB jobs as opposed to 65% on average. Similarly, 27.3% are in DE jobs
in contrast to 5.4% on average (missing data for school 2). 
A variety of reasons explain the differences between the minority groups,
not least of which is their different social standing. Roma youth are marginalized
whereas Indian-origin children in the UK are a relatively advantaged minority in
comparison with other minorities, which is not to say that they do not suffer from
a degree of social exclusion. A key explanatory factor seems to be the different
degree of endorsement of their national identities. 60% of the ethnic minority
pupils in my English sample define themselves as English and 68% as British
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as opposed to 40% of Roma in my Bulgarian sample who define themselves as
Bulgarian. The qualitative data show that for the majority of Indian children who
neither define themselves as European nor as British or English, this is not due
to  lack  of  knowledge  but  a  more  subtle  conflict  between their  geographical
origins and current addresses. The following two replies to the ‘Why did you say
you are not European?’ question are telling:
- I live from Asia, I go to Asia. I am Asian British, not British.
- Are British people European?
- Yes, they would be, because they are part of Europe.
- I don’t know. I asked my Mum ‘Am I European?’ No, I am not European. I
am either British or English or Hindu. That’s what my Mum says. I say
what she says.
These young people do not feel European not because they do not know
that Britain is part of Europe but because their ethnic geographical origin is in
conflict  with European identity.  This is where the notable difference with the
Bulgarian ethnic minority children lies – for the majority of Roma, it is their lack
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of knowledge about Europe and weak or no national identity that prevents them
from identifying as European:
- Are you European?
- From Europe?
- Do you feel European?
- No.
- What does it mean to be European?
- To be like – I don’t know.
- Why did you say you are not European?
- Because I am Bulgarian, Gypsy (“циганин”) actually.
- Are Gypsies and Bulgarians European?
- I don’t know.
Quite  tellingly,  most  Roma  who  reply  to  the  ‘What  does  it  mean  to  be
European?’ question say Europeans are an out-group. 61.1% do not know what
the EU is and among those who answer the open question, the majority says
that  the  EU is  about  (rich)  people  gathering  and talking.  When asked what
Europe is, a quarter of ethnic Bulgarians define it as continent while only one
Roma uses the geographical depiction. More than a third define Europe as a
state – different from Bulgaria. A description present only in the majority group
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is a union. Evidently, Roma children’s perceptions of Europe and European-
ness partially explain why they do not feel Europe – the majority of the Roma
children in my sample does not even know what Europe is, and those who do,
associate it with an exclusive club and/or a foreign country. Again a range of
factors intersect – their lower SES coupled with little exploration of Europe as a
topic on the educational curriculum and weaker parental mediation (Author A,
2013). The above answers also clearly show that identity is an ongoing process
and pupils’ attempts to come to grips with some of the concepts used by the
interviewer are indicative of some of the issues they encounter. Needless to
say, research interviews are only one potential method of gauging pupils’ ideas
and the wider study utilises other approaches to capture different aspects of the
identity formation process (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2013; Slavtcheva-Petkova and
Mihelj, 2013; Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2014).
The analysis of the open-ended questions reveals not only ethnic but also
socio-economic differences.  Children’s  social  status influences their  ideas of
Europe,  the  EU and what  it  means to  be  European.  The pupils  from more
advantaged backgrounds in Bulgaria tend to define Europe as both a political
and a geographical entity. Similarly, in England the word continent dominates
the accounts of middle-class pupils in my sample and is hardly ever used by the
children attending the school in the most deprived area of the county. Children
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of parents in lower-paid jobs tend to define Europe as a state – different to their
own. Overall, the lower children’s position in the social structure is, the more
likely they are either not to know what Europe is or to perceive it as a foreign
country or a rather exclusive, elite-led political entity – and hence something
they do not belong to. Needless to say, my sample is not representative so it
would be worth exploring these trends on a wider scale.
Finally,  it  is  worth further  investigating  the  role  of  school  as  well  as  the
importance of travel.  A closer look at table 2 reveals some notable national
differences in the levels of European knowledge. 91% in England report they
know what Europe is as opposed to only 62% in Bulgaria.  A reverse trend,
albeit not that strong, is evident in relation to the EU but also quite clearly in the
recognition of the EU flag – 84% of Bulgarian children recognise it as opposed
to 49% in England. The analysis of the school curriculum and the interviews
conducted with teachers and headteachers provide a few possible explanations.
In England most  teachers in my sample report  they have had Europe as a
geography topic on the curriculum. In the geography curriculum for key stage 2,
Europe  is  part  of  ‘locational  knowledge’  (Department  for  Education  and
Employment, 1999). Europe is studied as a continent and as part of a theme
with the aim ‘to study a range of places and environments in different parts of
the  world,  including  the  UK  and  the  EU’  (Department  for  Education  and
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Employment, 1999). Although the term “EU” is used, pupils do not learn about
the EU as an organisation but about  the three countries in the EU with the
highest populations and largest areas as well  as about the largest mountain
range, the longest river and the two largest seas. All teachers say they have not
covered the EU as an organisation and even if they mentioned the EU, it was
part of a geography topic or as one headteacher summarised, ‘learning about
different countries in the EU, but not much more’. In one school the majority of
children reported they were taught about the EU but their head teacher clarified
they had a topic about the UN. ‘There may be a major confusion between the
EU and the UN”, she said. The only example of teacher’s initiative was a French
teacher  who  was  actively  promoting  the  personality  of  the  then  French
President Nicolas Sarkozy as well as some national symbols of France. There
was a photo of Sarkozy in one of the classrooms and most children knew who
he was.
In Bulgaria, on the other hand, pupils in my sample have not studied about
Europe as a continent. The focus of the national curriculum is on developing
knowledge about their nation state and the national symbols and the target is
for children to ‘identify themselves through the national symbols’  (Ministry of
Education and Science,  2003).  Teachers  are  required to  nurture a ‘patriotic
feeling’ (Ministry of Education and Science, 2003). Europe is mentioned only
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once in year three when children learn that Bulgaria is situated in Southern
Europe. The EU is introduced as a topic in the last lesson at the end of year
four but all  children in the sample had not yet reached that point. Moreover,
teachers admitted that they rarely had the time to cover the very last lesson in
the textbooks. The only lessons in which they can potentially initiate discussions
about Europe are the so-called class-teachers’ lessons. ‘We were given a CD
about the EU when Bulgaria entered the EU in 2007. It is a very nice CD but I
haven’t  used it  because in these class-teacher lessons we mainly deal  with
housekeeping issues’,  a  teacher  explained.  Only one of  the seven teachers
interviewed  actually  showed  initiative  and  repeatedly  sent  emails  with
information about the EU to her pupils and put up a poster about the EU in their
classrooms.  The children in  her  class  appeared to  be  more  knowledgeable
about the EU than their peers. It is worth pointing out as well that both the EU
and the national flags are waved on top of most schools in Bulgaria. Moreover,
both flags are raised during official celebrations and ceremonies in school. 
Therefore, school  appears to be an important socialisation agent when it
comes to instilling knowledge about Europe but knowledge in itself, although a
prerequisite for identification, does not necessarily lead to European identities
(Slavtcheva-Petkova and Mihelj, 2013). Do trips to Europe make a difference
then? None of the children interviewed had participated in any organised trips or
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exchange visits but 16.8% of the Bulgarian children and 65.7% of the English
children have travelled on holiday to Europe. Most of these children (83.4% in
Bulgaria and 93.2% in England) claim they know what Europe is, but European
holidays seem to  imply  stronger  European identification  for  English  children
only.  Two-thirds  of  the  pupils  in  my  study  define  themselves  as  European
whereas in Bulgaria only half do. Bulgarian children probably see a disjuncture
between the Europe they live in and the one abroad, which they define as a
‘better place’. Exchange and study trips are likely to play a more positive role
because of the guided opportunities for learning.
To sum up, the answer to RQ1 is that  factors of  social  structuration are
related to young people’s European knowledge, identifications and support for
EU membership. In both my English and Bulgarian samples, identifications with
and  knowledge  about  Europe  and  the  EU  vary  significantly  with  SES  and
ethnicity. An ethnic majority child from a privileged background is more likely to
feel  European  than  an  ethnic  minority  one  from  a  low  socio-economic
background. The answer to RQ2 is not that clear-cut, though it seems that the
relative weight of these factors is contingent on the national context, and by and
large, the results are in line with some of the existing literature: in Bulgaria,
ethnic segregation seems to be stronger than social segregation (Ivanov, 2006;
Nounev, 2006), whereas in England a reverse pattern is noted (Smithers and
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Robinson, 2010). A word of caution is due. Different minority groups are studied
and  the  trends  might  vary  among other  minorities  and nations.  SES exerts
considerable influence on support for membership, whereas ethnicity seems to
be important only in Bulgaria. These results could be interpreted as additional
evidence of the relatively stronger impact of socio-economic differences in the
UK, and comparatively higher levels of ethnic segregation in Bulgaria. 
The answer to RQ3 is: trends of intersectionality are evident in my samples
in both countries but more so in Bulgaria. Ethnic minority pupils are much more
likely to be of poorer SES. Some young people are indeed hit by multiple waves
of exclusion and this applies fully to Bulgarian Roma. National  context is of
importance as well because the direction and degree of social inequalities as
well as the role school plays depends on it but this not a linear relationship. 
Conclusion
The findings show that even among the youngest Europeans there are patterns
of a social and partially ethnic segregation of the European project. In line with
prevalent  results  in  studies  on  the  impact  of  education  and  occupation  on
attitudes towards Europe among adults, the young people whose parents have
higher  social  status  and education are more  likely  to  be  in  support  of  their
country’s EU membership. The influence of ethnicity depends on the national
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context (and potentially on the ethnic minority group). Thus, the Roma ethnic
minorities in my Bulgarian sample are much more excluded from the European
project than the Asian ethnic minorities, mainly with family origins in India, in my
English sample. 
The main contribution this article makes, however, is in relation to the
sociology of European identity formation. Social and ethnic inequalities matter in
this process. European identity is predominantly elite and racialized and this is
perhaps largely due to the fact that young people’s knowledge is very much
sifted through their social backgrounds. Knowledge in itself does not necessarily
lead  to  identification,  as  the  example  of  the  Indian  children  shows,  but  in
general there is no identification without knowledge (Slavtcheva-Petkova and
Mihelj, 2013). Hence, for the time being it still seems to be the case that the
upper classes are much more engaged with the EU. 
Identity is indeed ‘grounded’ in ‘social structures and realities’ (Sanchez,
2006: 33) and the implications of this social division of European identities are
worrying not least because a significant proportion of the European population
is  potentially  left  out.  Furthermore,  these  happen  to  be  the  most  socially
disadvantaged groups. Even more troublesome is that the exclusion starts from
an early age and is already evident among 9-10-year-old children in my sample.
If  top-down  strategies  are  to  be  implemented  for  the  dissemination  of
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information  about  Europe  and/or  the  EU  and  the  potential  promotion  of
European identity and positive attitudes towards the EU, then attention should
be paid to more actively engaging the people at the margins of society. It goes
without saying that social backgrounds are not the only factors that influence
these  processes.  The  qualitative  questions  provide  further  insights  into  the
significance of  other  indicators.  Young people’s  definition  of  Europe is  very
important for their identification with it (Slavtcheva-Petkova and Mihelj, 2013).
Socialisation agents such as parents, school and the mass media also play a
significant  role  (Slavtcheva-Petkova,  2013).  The  study  shows that  the  more
pupils study about Europe at school, the more they know about it but this in
itself does not lead to them identifying themselves as European. Travel provides
further opportunities in that respect but again only the more affluent children,
mainly in England, benefit from these opportunities. To better account for the
role  of  national  context,  other  countries  should  be  compared  and  the
relationship with national identities should be established. Large-scale surveys
could  potentially  reveal  whether  the  trends  evident  in  this  sample  are
representative. Comparisons with Eurobarometer studies might also be useful.
Finally, this study is not without limitations. The sample is not representative
and the study looks at two specific ethnic minority groups in the two national
contexts.  It  is,  therefore,  difficult  to  make  claims  about  the  general  role  of
3
ethnicity, given that each ethnic minority group has different history and status.
It  is  also  worth  making  further  use  of  the  qualitative  data.  Finally,  a  full
sociological enquiry should involve an investigation of the EU’s presence in the
everyday life of children – a further task for researchers.
Notes
1. The results of  all  tests of  statistical  significance on relationships between
variables reported in the text are presented in table 3.
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48.5% 48.6% 49% 52.2
%
73.8% 64.2% 25.5% 35.8%
Note:  The data  for  England is  retrieved from the  Department  for  Education
January 2010 statistical release. The gender ratio applies to all 9-year-old pupils
(age as at 31 August 2009). The ethnicity ratio applies to all maintained primary,
state-funded secondary and special schools. The gender data for Bulgaria is
retrieved from the Ministry of Education statistical release for 2009/2010 and
includes all pupils in years 1-4. The Ministry of Education does not release data
on ethnicity so the data is retrieved from two NGO reports. There are significant
differences in the reported percentages. 45% is the reported figure for year 1
Roma pupils for the county included in the sample. In the last available report
(2002) the national average of Roma pupils in primary schools was between
14.5% and 20.6%. 
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Table 2. Knowledge, identities and support for EU membership by nationality
School Know
Europe 













Table 3. Statistically significant relationships between variables
Variables Relationship and tests
England Bulgaria
School and European knowledge χ2 = 11.190, d.f. = 5, p =
.048
School and EU knowledge χ2 = 22.116, d.f. = 5, p <
.001
School and recognition of EU flag χ2 = 19.084, d.f. = 5, 
p=.002
χ2 = 20.413, d.f. = 3, 
p<.001
School and recognition of euro 
coin
χ2 = 10.868, d.f. = 3, 
p=.012
School and support for EU 
membership
χ2 = 25.299, d.f. = 10, 
p=.005
χ2 = 21.698, d.f. = 6, 
p<.001
School and European 
identification
χ2 = 41.637, d.f. = 5, p <
.001
χ2 = 22.456, d.f. = 3, p 
< .001
Occupation and European 
knowledge
 = .333, p = .012  = .327, p < .001
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Occupation and EU knowledge  = .373, p = .005
Occupation and European 
identification
 = .529, p < .001  = .404, p < .001
Occupation and recognition of EU
flag
 = .403, p = .002  = .328, p < .001
Occupation and EU membership 
support
χ2 = 23.995, d.f. = 6, p 
< .001
Education and EU knowledge  = .362, p = .025
Education and European 
identification
 = .386, p = .015  = .410, p < .001
Education and EU membership 
support 
χ2 = 21.399, d.f. = 10, p 
=018
Ethnicity and EU flag recognition χ2 = 22.629, d.f. = 1, p 
< .001
Ethnicity and EU membership 
support
χ2 = 15.705, d.f. = 2, p 
< .001
Ethnicity and European 
identification
χ2 = 9.391, d.f. = 1, p 
= .002 φ = .374, p 
χ2 = 22.285, d.f. = 1, p 
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= .002 < .001
φ = .456, p < .001
Note: These relationships are discussed in the text and this table shows the 
results of the tests of statistical significance
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